India’s Neemrana Industrial Park for Japanese Firms by Kazuyuki Motohashi
93© The Author(s) 2015
K. Motohashi, Global Business Strategy, Springer Texts in Business 
and Economics, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55468-4_6
 6 India’s Neemrana Industrial Park for Japanese Firms 
6.1  Introduction 
 India is second only to China in terms of population. India’s economic growth since 
the mid-2000s has risen to around 8 %, and is now considered as having a promising 
future market. However, the driving force behind this economic growth is the coun-
try’s service industry, particularly its IT service industry. As compared to China, 
India trails in its growth in the manufacturing industry. One reason for this gap is the 
lack of infrastructure in India. For a manufacturing industry to grow, basic infra-
structure, such as power and water, and logistics facilities, such as roads, railways, 
and ports for imports and exports, are required. However, infrastructure develop-
ment in India has not progressed as planned. Half of India’s population is under the 
age of 25, resulting in a relatively low average age. Therefore, creation of employ-
ment opportunities for this younger generation is important. For this reason, it is 
necessary to promote the manufacturing industry having a high employment absorp-
tion capacity. Infrastructure creation is thus an important policy issue for the Indian 
government. 
 The Neemrana Industrial Park for Japanese fi rms was created with the coopera-
tion of the Japanese government and the state government of Rajasthan, situated to 
the southwest of Delhi. This project has become a highly anticipated one even 
within the Indian government. Industries in Rajasthan have focused on agriculture 
and mining such as for marble and cement. The relative lag in industrialization has 
motivated the Rajasthan state government to provide incentives to factories to set up 
operations such as automotive industries having high employment absorption 
capacity. On the other hand, India carries a relatively higher investment risk for 
Japanese companies for a variety of reasons than do other nearby Asian countries, 
such as China. These companies fi nd themselves forced to make investment deci-
sions based on insuffi cient decision-making information, for example, the accessi-
bility of infrastructure such as power and water necessary to operate factories, 
availability of effi cient and appropriate workers, or the ability to adequately respond 
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to various central or local government regulations and directives. Maruti Suzuki and 
Honda, which together comprise more than 40 % of India’s passenger cars, operate 
factories near Delhi and have strong incentives to attract parts and materials manu-
facturers to India to strengthen cost competitiveness. Against this backdrop, Japan’s 
External Trade Organization (JETRO) has taken the lead in outfi tting the industrial 
parks to lure, primarily, Japanese auto-related companies to India, thereby reducing 
risks that individual companies otherwise could not handle. 
6.2  Background of Neemrana Industrial Park 
 The Neemrana Industrial Park is located in the state of Rajasthan, and is approxi-
mately 105 km southwest of Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport (a 90 min 
drive). The Park faces National Highway 8, connecting Delhi and Mumbai. With the 
establishment of Phase III (1,166 acres), it will be the fi rst in India to be developed 
specifi cally for Japanese companies (Fig.  6.1 ). 
 India has pursued industrial decentralization policies aiming to balance develop-
ment since the 1970s by providing industrial location guidance to underdeveloped 
and unindustrialized regions. In addition to the Delhi Special Area, the center of 
development since the latter half of the 1980s, development plans have expanded in 
the neighboring states of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Haryana, and Rajasthan (in part), all 
of which comprise the National Capital Region (NCR). These plans aim to relieve 
overpopulated conditions in the capital and decentralize economic activities. 
 Fig. 6.1  Map of Neemrana Industrial Park and surrounding area 
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 The NCR is a planned area adjacent to Delhi and is based in seven centers 
(Gurgaon, Faridabad, Noida, Ghaziabad, Sonipat, Greater Noida, and Meerut) 
located along the National Highways radiating outward from Delhi. It is near con-
sumer markets centered in Delhi, and is a valuable base for the expansion of the 
Northern Indian market. Being based near the capital has many other advantages, 
such as better communication with government and other enterprises as well as 
procuring excellent labor. The nexus of industrial development is the industrial 
parks, and developmental corporations under the control of each state’s department 
of industries are responsible for the purchase, establishment, and sale of properties 
in the parks. 
 The Noida Business Park, situated in UP, is the largest industrial park in the 
NCR, and has been under development since 1976. Phase I saw the participation of 
smaller companies, while Phases II and III saw the participation of medium-sized 
companies. Plans to proceed with medium- and large-sized factories in this region, 
made up primarily of foreign auto makers, necessitated vast open spaces, and thus 
the Greater Noida industrial park was developed at a distance of about 10–15 km 
southeast of Noida. The foray of automakers into Greater Noida spurred the expan-
sion of the auto parts market, thus currently making this region the greatest agglom-
eration of auto industry companies. Suzuki (passenger cars in 1983) and Honda 
(motorcycles in 1984) built factories in Gurgaon, Haryana, during the 1980s. 
Gurgaon is located to the southwest of Delhi, making it possible to procure parts 
from nearby areas of Noida and Greater Noida, resulting in this region also having 
an agglomeration of auto industry companies. 
 In India today, Suzuki and Honda procure 80–90 % of parts locally, although this 
fi gure applies only to fi nished vehicles. Japanese parts manufacturers in India that 
supply to automakers, procure approximately 60 % of their raw materials interna-
tionally. It is becoming more diffi cult, even within India, to compete in price, as 
low-cost cars such as the “Nano” made by Tata Motors are causing a stir with its 
INR 100,000 (about JPY 200,000) price tag. There is an increasing necessity for 
Japanese manufacturers to procure not only fi rst-tier parts, but also second- and 
even third-tier parts from local sources in the future to enable price competitiveness 
through cost reduction. Automakers await the entry of second- and third-tier 
Japanese parts suppliers into India, and when they do, these suppliers will need land 
for factories. These parts manufacturers are oftentimes small- and medium-sized 
fi rms, with low manpower or capital, making it diffi cult to independently enter the 
Indian market. Thus, JETRO’s initiative is essential by kicking off projects to build 
industrial parks for Japanese companies. 
 The issue is primarily location based. With sudden farmland expropriations to 
develop industrial parks, land prices have risen in Noida and Greater Noida in the 
state of UP. JETRO approached Faridabad and Gurgaon in the state of Haryana, but 
industrial parks have already been developed in these regions, causing land prices to 
skyrocket. Therefore, the state of Rajasthan, which had missed the development 
wave, came under JETRO’s radar. Rajasthan was originally a kingdom (name 
derived from “raja” or king and “stan” or country) with territories ruled over by a 
 maharaja (a powerful king), today it is said to have a citizenry with an earnest 
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nature. Vasundhara Raje, of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BPJ), became the fi rst 
female chief minister of the state in 2003 proves the change. Chief Minister Raje 
was very popular among those in the industry and had a reputation for being a wise 
and decisive leader. Further momentum for industrialization was gained by the 
aggressive efforts of the Chief of Industries in the Raje cabinet. The managing 
director of the Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation 
Ltd. (RIICO), a believer in the promotion of industrial development and having a 
deep understanding of economic development in China, enabled agreements with 
Japan to proceed smoothly. 
 RIICO created a Japan Desk, and appointed Anil Sharma as general manager. 
Mr. Sharma notes the characteristics of the state of Rajasthan as an ideal location for 
industry operations: “The laws and systems are well put together for India as a 
whole, compared with developing nations. India is a democracy, and laws and sys-
tems don’t change according to the whims of government. Also, contracts are seen 
as things to be honored. Next, we have an abundant workforce. There have been 76 
engineering fi rms established in the state of Rajasthan in the last 15 years, and the 
state has produced a tremendous number of IT and software-related companies. An 
Industrial Training Institute (ITI) has also been established to develop factory work-
ers. Third, the electric power infrastructure is well developed compared with 
Haryana and Punjab near Delhi. Finally, there is policy support. Much support is 
given to lure industry here through RIICO.” 
 In regards to land, the plan has always been to sell property with RIICO as the 
landowner, causing the appropriation to be free of problems often inherent with 
complex land ownership. Another important factor was that this land was, for the 
most part, a desert, and therefore not appropriate for agricultural use. All 1,166 
acres of Phase III of the Neemrana Industrial Park sitting alongside National 
Highway 8, in Rajasthan was provided as an industrial park for Japanese compa-
nies. In July 2006, the Japanese government requested the state government of 
Rajasthan for (1) priority purchase rights for Japanese companies over a 2 year 
period (which in 2008 was extended for another year) and (2) a reduction in the state 
border tax (from 4 to 0.25 %). In that same month, JETRO and RIICO entered into 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to jointly support a “campaign to facilitate 
Japanese investment”. For the fi rst 6 months, not many companies were convinced 
to set up operations in Rajasthan, but with the Indian government’s focus on infra-
structure development to lure foreign (particularly Japanese) companies, the cam-
paign became a Japanese–Indian “Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project” 
(DMIC); these efforts came to be more broadly known. 
6.3  DMIC: Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor 
 The Neemrana Industrial Park was an early bird project part of the larger DMIC 
project. It was an important joint Japan–India industry promotion proposal. 
 The DMIC “is a joint Japan–India project for a major industrial area connecting 
industrial parts and ports via freight railways and roads between Delhi and Mumbai, 
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for the purpose of promoting foreign investment and exports.” (JETRO Delhi 
“DMIC concept explanatory material, December 2009”) By constructing approxi-
mately 1,500 km of new freight railways between the interior political capital of 
Delhi and the industrial port city of Mumbai, it attempts to invigorate the Indian 
industry by outfi tting the railway as its key traffi c route, by building industrial parks, 
interior distribution facilities, and new ports along the railway corridor. Preparations 
for a high-speed railway scheduled for completion in 2016 are underway, and the 
Japanese government has committed toward contributing construction capital out of 
Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) funds (Fig.  6.2 ). 
 This is a massive Indian project involving six states (Haryana, UP, Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra) and multiple government organiza-
tions (state departments of commerce, offi ces of chief ministers, planning commit-
tees, departments of fi nance, infrastructure-related departments). The DMIC 
Development Corporation (DMICDC) was established in January 2008 as a pan- 
state special purpose development organization. The development of the DMIC 
Master Plan was completed in 2010, outlining a grand concept for constructing a 
total of 24 industrial cities across the six states by 2030. With acceleration of urban-
ization among the Indian population, it is estimated that 40 % of India’s total popu-
lation will live in urban areas by 2030. Because of this, the DMIC Master Plan calls 
for the job creation through construction of industrial parks and for the urban 
 Fig. 6.2  Map of DMIC and High-Speed Railway ( Source : JETRO Delhi materials from DMIC) 
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development of surrounding regions as residential areas. The DMICDC oversees all 
these projects and assumes the role of developer in concert with state 
governments. 
 In India, the management of land not owned by citizens is the responsibility of 
state governments. Accordingly, actual urban development is carried out by state 
governments providing land to Special Purpose Companies (SPCs), which fi nance 
the DMIC project through funds to develop each urban area. Projects that have a 
high potential for commercialization, such as electric power projects, are under-
taken as Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs), with the expectation of joint public 
private fi nancing. Projects of a more public nature, such as roads and water services, 
are managed directly by the SPCs as public works projects. 
 However, these development plans are still in their conceptual stages, and fund-
ing will be necessary from the Indian government to proceed with future urban 
development. Also, the 24 new cities outlined by the Master Plan are, for the most 
part, to be established in vacant areas. It is unlikely that companies will set up 
operations in industrial parks with low infrastructure, and with no companies in 
hand to occupy an industrial park, private companies will be slow to invest in 
infrastructure. 
 It will take considerable time to carry out development according to the DMIC 
Master Plan, even though early bird development projects have been set up in 
advance of fi nalizing the Master Plan. The Neemrana Industrial Park is one such 
project, and a smart factory project bolstered by the Japanese government is also 
moving forward, as explained later. Another early bird project is a free trade and 
warehousing zone planned for construction in the state of Haryana by Mitsui 
Bussan. This will create an inland container depot (ICD) to directly transport con-
tainers via high-speed railroads from ports to the ICD, and will enable customs 
clearance in inland areas. There are currently two ICDs, Dadri in Uttar Pradesh, and 
Tughlakabad in Delhi, although according to the DMIC Master Plan another ICD is 
expected to be built near Neemrana. The high-speed railway will not only be used 
to supply parts from Mumbai to Delhi, but is anticipated to signifi cantly contribute 
toward regional economic development due to its role as the key distribution chan-
nel connecting the two large cities of Northern India and the medium-sized cities 
along its pat 
6.4  India’s Industrial Infrastructure 
 Before explaining the details of the Neemrana Industrial Park, below is a quick 
overview of the infrastructure necessary for setting up manufacturing sites in India. 
 First are roadways, which are one method for overland transport. Most national 
highways, including National Highway 8 connecting Delhi and Mumbai, are two- 
lane drives, on which trucks, motorcycles, auto rickshaws, bicycles, livestock, and 
pedestrians commute. Accordingly, traffi c is often congested and high-speed trans-
port is impossible. 
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 India ranks fourth in the world in terms of railway length, with a total of 
633,332 km. However, only 28 % of these are electricity operated and only 25 % are 
double-tracked. Freight cars travel at a speed of only 23 km/h and although travel 
fares are low, freight shipments are expensive. Thus, it is cheaper to transport goods 
by truck. 
 The Indian federal government manages 12 main ports: Kandla, Mumbai, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mormugao, New Mangalore, Cochin, Tuticorin, Chennai, 
Ennore, Vishakhapatnam, Paradip, and Kolkata. These ports together handle 464 
mn tons annually. Ports under the jurisdiction of state and local governments are 
termed as “non-major ports” (or “minor ports”). These ports handle a total of 160 
mn tons annually. Northern India, which has no coastline, relies on container ship-
ments from gateway ports in the western part of the country. India’s western ports 
handle 69 % of all container freight. 
 Stable electric power supply is another requirement for an industrial park. In 
2010, electric power demand in India was 8.5 mn gigawatt-hour (GWh), an increase 
of more than six percent over the last 5 years. Peak electricity demand is estimated 
to increase as high as 120 GW, driving overall demand far higher than the country’s 
supply capacity of approximately one mn GWh. In addition, issues related to high 
transmission and distribution loss rates and theft of electric power decrease the elec-
tric power availability for those who need it, making power outages a frequent 
occurrence. One reason for this is the strain on power company fee schedules. Fee 
schedules are constrained by low (or free) rates for farmers, which are offset by 
industries paying relatively higher fees, resulting in a cross subsidy of sorts. 
Companies pay high power bills to run their factories, and work with the frequent 
power outages and shortages. It is therefore common for large-scale factories to 
have in-house power generation. 
 Due to low groundwater levels and water contamination, water shortages are 
common in Northern India. In an attempt to limit the overuse of groundwater and 
promote its restoration, the Indian government has asked all states to enact rainwa-
ter harvesting laws (regulations that mandate the return of water to nearby regions 
if groundwater usage in that region is in excess of rainwater in the region). Regions 
around Delhi have plans for constructing water desalination plants; however, there 
are as yet no prospects for solving water shortages. 
6.5  Companies Operating at Neemrana Industrial Park 
 As of March 2012, 14 companies have set up operations in the Neemrana Industrial 
Park (Phase III for Japanese fi rms). While there were some cancelations by compa-
nies that had planned to set up, particularly during the economic downturn on 
account of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, site sales in the Park have since recov-
ered is at almost full occupancy as of 2012. Companies in the Park (and those plan-
ning to set operations) hold regular meetings to share information, during which 
they discuss issues and solutions for building and operating factories, as well as 
compile requests to the state government and RIICO. These combined requests are 
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more effective rather than an independent request. In addition, receiving approval 
from the administration can be extremely complicated, requiring the use of a local 
consultant at certain circumstances. Even in these cases, companies can share spe-
cifi c information on “predatory” consultants, quality of local consultants, and dif-
ferences in rates—information that cannot be obtained through JETRO—making 
the approval process relatively easier. JETRO’s investment coordinator manages 
negotiations with the development company regarding joint requests made at these 
meetings. Further, JETRO’s Delhi offi ce has opened a business support center that 
provides advice on Indian investments by an investment coordinator and helps solve 
a myriad of minor issues that arise from Japanese companies investing in India. 
 Below is an interview-based overview of the current status of three companies 
(auto parts maker Company A, auto materials maker Company B, and air- 
conditioning equipment maker Company C) engaging in business in the Neemrana 
Industrial Park.
 Background and Status of Expansion in Neemrana 
•  Company A ventured into India as a supplier of brakes, timing their entry to coin-
cide with the release of the Honda City 2008 model. Honda has a factory in 
Greater Noida; therefore, the company began its search for a property in Noida 
and areas to the south of Noida along National Highway 8, such as Haryana, 
Manesar, and Bawal. The industrial park in Bawal was completely sold out as of 
2006. The company received word that Phase III of the industrial park in Bawal 
of approximately 1,100 acres in size would be developed, thus Company A sent a 
letter to the development company, HISC (Haryana Industrial State Corporation), 
requesting the purchase of 30 acres. However, the Company A did not receive any 
response on the tentative time or price of purchasing the property. Subsequently, 
the company heard of another industrial park being built in Neemrana in the state 
of Rajasthan. It learned that the cost of property in Haryana was INR 1,800 per 
square meter, while that in Neemrana was INR 970 per square meter. The com-
pany analyzed the distance factor (Manesar was 20–30 min away from Neemrana) 
and lot size and decided to set up operations in Neemrana because Honda decided 
to build a factory in Tapukara, located in Rajasthan as well. 
•  On Company B’s entry the Indian market, they selected a site near Delhi in the 
north, near Honda and Maruti Suzuki, after considering Bawal, Manesar, and 
Noida, but soon realized that the land suitable for an industrial park was scarce. 
In coordination with JETRO and RIICO, the company was introduced to 
Neemrana, an industrial park for Japanese companies, making Neemrana a 
potential candidate as their location. They selected Neemrana as it was less 
expensive and clearly defi ned property rights (provided by the state government 
of Rajasthan). JETRO being the intermediary to Neemrana, Company B thought 
of negotiations with the local government as credible. 
•  After thoroughly analyzing India to set up operations, including Mumbai, Pune, 
and Bangalore, Company C found that Neemrana was the only place they could 
acquire a substantial amount of property on which they could begin construction 
in the near future. In addition, Company C’s Indian sales subsidiary was located 
in Gurgaon. 
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 Factory Operations 
•  According to Company A, labor employment at Neemrana is inexpensive, 
despite the expenses such as bus fares for training and commuting. Indian factory 
worker capacity is not very different from its Chinese counterparts, and Company 
A considers worker quality as satisfactory. The company uses local suppliers for 
some raw materials, although most of it is imported from countries like Japan, 
and aims to increase the percentage of locally sourced parts. 
•  Before beginning operations in its Neemrana factory, Company B produced 
materials in Thailand, which it then supplied to a fi nished goods manufacturer in 
India. These materials entered the country at the Mumbai port, which were then 
transported by rail. The company currently imports most of their raw materials, 
but fi nds the need locally procure so as to strengthen its future cost competitive-
ness. The company employs 46 Indians and six Japanese workers, and plans to 
become more localized by gradually reducing the number of Japanese expatri-
ates. Ceasing operations according to Indian law is complicated for companies 
with more than 100 employees, inhibiting the company’s progress as it considers 
expansion. 
•  Company C procures almost none of its materials locally, but instead imports 
them from countries such as Japan, Thailand, and China. Thus, the need to begin 
sourcing them locally is felt; however, they fi nd it diffi cult to do so because of 
quality and other issues. 
 Risk Factors in Indian Industrial Parks and Expansion into the Indian Market 
 1.  Company A was aware of the issues related with electricity, water, and sewerage 
when it conducted a feasibility study on entering the Indian market. It had 
already determined and created a budget to prepare and handle such issues.
•  According to Company A, several reports must be fi led with various depart-
ments of the Indian government, and the use of a local consultant is manda-
tory. Inquiries and requests are compiled during information sharing meetings 
and are submitted to RIICO. A Japan desk has been created within RIICO, 
which has proven invaluable by providing a one-stop service. 
•  Company A also notes that local negotiations are diffi cult for Japanese com-
panies, making it important to hire quality locals as heads of general affairs 
and other positions. 
•  Groundwater was the biggest issue for Company A, the fi rst company to 
begin operations at the Neemrana Industrial Park. Water shortages were evi-
dent with the second company setting operations in the park, and conditions 
on methods for drawing water, and the amounts they could draw became more 
stringent. Company A negotiated with the government agency having juris-
diction over water through JETRO and RIICO. 
 2.  Company B conducted a feasibility study before its entry into India, analyzing 
labor management (union issues), infrastructure (e.g., focusing on electricity and 
water issues, and incorporating in-house power generation into their plans), and 
other issues.
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•  Company B was not of the notion that water-related issues would pose a 
potential problem. Because of no wastewater facilities, the company took it 
upon itself to process its own wastewater, using it in a garden. It thus feels that 
factories with large amounts of wastewater will have problems. Receiving 
approvals for water was most cumbersome. Water harvesting regulations 
required the company to replace groundwater used in excess of the amount of 
rainfall. However, the region is a desert receiving little rainfall. 
•  Company B also reports of complicated taxation policies. Cases of double 
taxation, as well as several different types of taxes, such as duties, state taxes, 
excise taxes, and inter-state taxes, are imposed and are understood only by 
Indian consultants. The company has trouble understanding refunds such as 
incentives. 
 3.  Company C also notes of a severe water-related problem. They were unaware of 
rainwater harvesting before setting up operations; however, they are able to com-
ply with regulations because they own an expansive property. All companies in 
the park have water-related issues, and are working in association with JETRO 
to resolve them. As a result, RIICO is in the process of constructing a reservoir, 
and the water stored there will be distributed to each company. In addition, in- 
house power generation via diesel is expensive. 
6.6  The Smart Factory Concept at Neemrana Industrial Park 
 The DMIC provides a tremendous opportunity to solve infrastructure issues and, as 
a project of the Indian government supported by the Japanese government, is per-
ceived to be an opportunity to increase commerce in the surrounding area. In the 
summer of 2008, Hitachi set up a business support center in Delhi to develop new 
projects in India and also promulgated the concept of a joint energy center within 
the Neemrana Industrial Park, a joint-use facility to supply electricity to companies 
in the Park. Electric power supply is constantly constrained within India, and power 
outages are common lasting for few hours during the course of a day. These circum-
stances have caused companies at the Park to move toward in-house generation, 
although the costs to do so are high and can lead to an operational slow down. Also, 
because water is necessary to run diesel-based, in-house power generation systems, 
the joint energy center will serve to conserve water. 
 However, companies operating in the same region have already implemented in- 
house power generation equipment, and so a proposal to install and jointly use new 
gas turbine generators was not adopted. In 2009, Hitachi obtained funding from the 
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) for 
research into the feasibility of an interchangeable system to supply stable electric 
power supply to Indian industrial parks by implementing micro grids and smart 
grids that would connect approximately 40 in-house diesel power generators (power 
generating capability of 20,000 kilo watts) where companies may freely share 
power generated by such a system. 
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 Ultimately, technical challenges surfaced and it was concluded that deployment 
of such a system was too complicated. However, Hitachi’s efforts have endured as 
the smart factory concept in the Neemrana Industrial Park. This concept received 
certifi cation as an “outsourcing project for research on infrastructure export promo-
tion” from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in Japan, and with 
Sumitomo Corporation acting as the managing company, feasibility studies were 
conducted on three projects: (1) an electric power generation project, (2) a water 
treatment project, and (3) a logistics project. The power generation project was led 
by Kansai Electric, and with an anticipated increase in demand for electric power 
caused by new companies beginning production within the Park, the company is 
planning an electric and heat supply operation based on a co-generation system 
using on-site gas turbines (or gas engines). The water treatment project was led by 
Hitachi, which considered providing a treatment system for on-site wastewater. As 
a result of the feasibility study, the wastewater treatment project was canceled due 
to anticipated demand shortages required to make the system economically feasible. 
However, groundwater levels at Neemrana are found to be dropping, and it is pos-
sible that the project would become economically feasible in the event that the 
Rajasthan government imposed stricter water recovery regulations. The logistics 
project was led by Nihon Express, which considered a proposal to make logistics 
both inside and outside of factories more effi cient via a milk-run system. However, 
freight theft is common in India, and implementing the project was deemed as dif-
fi cult because, among other reasons, procedures to handle theft of goods from mul-
tiple companies were complex. 
 METI outsourced this survey of infrastructure exporting under a system created 
to promote exports of infrastructure packages, such as electric power and water. 
Specifi c projects have been initiated as a result of the Neemrana feasibility studies. 
Project entities are accumulating the necessary know-how, expected to be laterally 
expanding to similar projects at other industrial parks. The DMIC is a large-scale 
regional development project sponsored by both Indian and Japanese governments, 
and latent demand for electric power and water systems within the Neemrana region 
alone is thought to be signifi cant. However, companies in the industrial park are 
required to expand operations within the confi nes of their own production plans and 
are not used to moving in tandem with implementing large, joint-use systems to 
become more effi cient. Accordingly, the project entities providing infrastructure 
must make investments somewhat ahead of the curve, requiring them to forecast 
demand and ascertain profi tability by appropriate means. 
6.7  Significance of This Case Study and Suggested 
Questions 
 This case study was conducted to increase the understanding of operating environ-
ments in India from the perspective of manufacturers and cultivate a sense based on 
actual examples that having friendly relations with local governments (in this case, 
the government of the state of Rajasthan) is pertinent to expanding businesses 
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within developing nations. Further, this case study highlights the support provided 
by the Japanese government owing to the expansion of automotive parts companies 
into India, thus infl uencing the industrial competitiveness of automakers. 
 Companies in the Neemrana Industrial Park are primarily parts and materials 
suppliers to local automakers such as Suzuki and Honda; we began our discussion 
with their expansion into India. However, there are many lessons to be learned from 
this case study in regards to risk management during a foreign expansion. In addi-
tion, the smart factory concept used by industrial parks provides a basis for further 
consideration of the possibility of infrastructure operations (for example, the com-
plex service operations case study in Chap.  5 ) in India. 
 Using this case study, the following questions can be considered to further 
deepen the understanding of global strategy:
•  The Neemrana Industrial Park was created in cooperation between the Indian 
and Japanese governments. Why did both governments work together on this 
project? Why is government involvement needed? 
•  What are the risks for building factories in India? How can companies reduce 
their risk by locating their facilities within an industrial park, such as the 
Neemrana Industrial Park? 
•  The smart factory concept was the subject of a feasibility study sponsored by the 
Japanese government. Is this project feasible? Detail the feasibilities of electric 
power, water, and logistics services. 
•  It is thought that infrastructure services (electric power, water, logistics, etc.) 
provide extensive business opportunities in India. How should Japanese fi rms 
participate in these opportunities? 
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